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Introduction 
 “You, the people, in your popular uprising succeeded in cutting off the monster’s head, 
but the lifeless body continues to deceive you that the monster is still dangerous.  No, It is 
not!  Having cut off the monster’s head, it is your sacred duty to push down the monster’s 
body, not stand in fear of it.”1 
These are the bold words of Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in April of 1985.  He is addressing the 
people of Sudan after the recent popular people’s uprising, which overthrew the President of 
Sudan, Jaafar Nimeiri.  Nimeiri is seen as an oppressive dictator and is depicted as the 
“monster’s head” in the opening quote. However, Garang does not only call for the removal of 
the monster’s head, but for the destruction of the body as well.  The monster’s body is 
Nimeirism, which is a term that describes the various policies and dictatorial, exploitative actions 
of President Nimeiri.  Garang lists several “provocations” by Nimeiri that help give us a base 
understanding of the physical manifestation of Nimeirism.  Garang accuses Nimeiri of 
“institutionalizing corruption and bribery,” and of “dismantling” the Addis Ababa Agreement,2 
and of trying to change the Southern boundaries in order to “deprive” the South of fruitful 
agricultural land.3  He also condemns Nimeiri for calling for the division of South Sudan into 
three “mini-regions,”4 and for forcing all Sudanese to abide by Islamic Shari’a law.5  Finally, 
Garang accuses Nimeiri of being a “one-man dictator who clings to power by means of use of 
                                                          
1
 John Garang,“Speech by John Garang, 9 April 1985, following downfall of Nimeiri,” in The Call for 
Democracy in Sudan, Mansour Khalid ed. (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1992), 41. 
2
 The Addis Ababa Agreement is the peace accord that ended the first civil war between North and South 
Sudan in 1972, and which began shortly after their independence in 1956. 
3
 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 3 March 1984,” in Khalid, Call for Democracy, 20-1. 
4
 Ibid., 22. 
5
 Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at the Opening Session of the Preliminary Dialogue 
between SPLM/SPLA and the National Alliance for National Salvation, held at Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in 
Khalid  Call for Democracy, 131. 
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savage repression, torture, unlawful detention, harassment and murder of innocent citizens by the 
security apparatus.”6 Garang resolves that he is prepared to “fight a long war” in order to defeat 
all “institutions of oppression that have been evolved in Khartoum to oppress the masses of the 
Sudanese people.”7This is the monster that John Garang sought to destroy in his lifetime.  
Nimeirism is a model of oppression against which John Garang pitted his efforts of liberation.  In 
defiance of Nimeirism, Garang offered a new nationalism, which he called Sudanism, which 
recognizes the ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity of Sudan and calls for a new, uniquely 
Sudanese identity that acknowledges all of this diversity in Sudan.8 Garang’s Sudanism is 
therefore inherently opposed to divisiveness and separatism, and is disposed to unity.  This thesis 
examines the wars between Sudanism and Nimeirism and Sudanism and secessionism in the 
context of the second civil war in Sudan starting in 1983.  In the following pages I will argue that 
John Garang remained consistent and persistent in heralding a new, united Sudan based on 
Sudanism.  Sudanism was at heart a nationalist movement.  Using James L. Gelvin’s model of 
the development and nature of nationalisms I will demonstrate that Garang’s Sudanism was a 
peculiar but authentic form of nationalism.9  
 Garang had a vision for a new, restructured Sudan based on a nationalism of Sudanism 
rooted in optimism and hope for the long neglected, exploited, “excluded” and impoverished 
people of Sudan.  He fought with fervor against the oligarchy of the Northern Arab elites, with a 
hope of redistributing power to all the different peoples in Sudan, in order for there to be peace 
and prosperity for all. 
                                                          
6
 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 3 March 1984,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 27. 
7
 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 22 March 1985,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 27. 
8
 Garang, “Seminar with John Garang de Mabior at the Brokings Institution, Washington, D.C. Friday, 9 
June, 1989,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 213. 
9
 James L. Gelvin is Associate Professor in History at the University of California, Los Angeles.  He is the 
author of Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (1998) and The Modern 
Middle East: A History (2004), and other topics on nationalism and the social and cultural history of the modern 
Middle East during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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John Garang and the Jonglei Canal 
 The foundations of Garang’s nationalism can be detected in his dissertation on the 
“socio-economic” development of the Jonglei Canal, which he writes at Iowa State University in 
1981.   Garang writes at a time when the “vast agricultural production potential of Sudan is 
estimated at more than 200 million feddans suitable for agricultural use.”10 One feddan of land is 
1.038 acres, which means that Sudan was estimated to have 207,600,000 acres of viable 
agricultural land.11  Garang continues that it is based on this estimation that he views Sudan as 
the potential “Breadbasket of the Middle East” as a “major granary of the world.”12 He saw this 
as a national goal that should serve to benefit all of Sudan, not just the more industrialized 
North.13 Garang supported the modernizing of agriculture in Sudan, in part to help sustain North-
Central and North Eastern Sudan, which is located in the mostly desert region of Sudan.14  He 
criticized the Executive Council of the National Council for Development Projects because they 
were only offering “marginal improvements” to the inhabitants near the Jonglei Canal in 
southern areas where most of the rainfall takes place.15  This implies that the Khartoum 
government was continuing its legacy of neglect of the Southern Sudan by manipulating the 
Jonglei Canal to benefit Khartoum.  Although the source of most of the rain water used by the 
canal would be located in the South, Khartoum neglected Southerners and used their resources to 
                                                          
10
 John Garang de Mabior, “Identifying, Selecting, and Implementing Rural Development Strategies For 
Socio-Economic Development in the Jonglei Canal Projects Area; Southern Region, Sudan” (PhD diss., Iowa State 
University, 1981), 219. 
11
 Ibid., 259. 
12
 Ibid., 219. 
13
 Ibid., 219. 
14
 Ibid., 219. 
15
 Ibid., 220. 
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benefit the “minority clique regime.”16 Garang perceived it to be Khartoum’s responsibility to 
make the transition from subsistence agriculture to “modern commercial production” through 
“deliberate government policy” and interventions in traditional agriculture.”17 All of this should 
take place according to national goals and interests. 
 According to John Garang, the construction of the Jonglei Canal was a necessary step for 
modernizing agriculture in Sudan and for realizing Sudan’s agricultural potential.  If properly 
used for the common good of all Sudanese, then it would have been highly beneficial.  However, 
Garang suggests that Khartoum’s facilitation of the canal did not espouse “regional equity,” and 
was a continuation of its historical neglect of non-Northern regions, especially of the South.  As 
we will see later, Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) halts the building of the 
Jonglei Canal in order to weaken the Khartoum government.  He claims to have stopped the 
canal project until power is taken from Nimeiri.18 Garang’s goal will be that the benefits of the 
Jonglei Canal will be distributed among all Sudanese for the benefit of all.   
 Garang’s goal for the use of the Jonglei Canal for the “common good” of all Sudanese 
coincides with Gelvin’s ideas about nationalism, and how nationalist ideologies are based on the 
“common interest” or the “common good” of the people.  Gelvin writes that “all nationalists 
believe that nations possess something called a ‘common interest,’ and it is the role of the state to 
                                                          
16
 Minority clique regime is a term that Garang uses frequently to describe any oppressive Khartoum 
governments that promote sectarianism, and who exploit the Sudanese masses for the benefit of the few, ruling elite 
in Khartoum.  This minority clique often comprises Arab elites, and has also been referred to as the Arab hegemony, 
or the hegemony of the North or “clique-chauvinism.”  
“Sudanese Rebel Leader’s Appeal to the People,” Text of appeal, with introduction Radio SPLA in English 
(1300 gmt 10 Nov 84), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4 The Middle East, Africa and Latin America; A. 
THE MIDDLE EAST; ME/7800/A1 (November 14, 1984). 
17
 Garang, PhD diss., 43.  
18
“Sudanese Dissident Leader Interviewed by Libyan Radio,” Excerpts from poorly heard interview given 
‘somewhere outside Jamahiriyah,’ Tripoli Voice of the Greater Arab Homeland (2230 gmt 10 May 84), BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, The Middle East, Africa and Latin America; A. THE MIDDLE EAST; 
ME/7642/A/1 (May 14, 1984). 
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promote it.”19 As a nationalist who promoted Sudanism, Garang sought to utilize the Jonglei 
Canal for the benefit of Nubians, Darfurians, Arab Northerners, Dinka, Nuer, and all Sudanese 
alike.  He perceived the agricultural benefits of the canal as being a common interest of the 
“Sudanese” nation that he represented.  The case of the Jonglei Canal is also interesting in the 
context of Gelvin’s theory about nationalist movements because he emphasizes the connection 
between the “spread of modern world economic and state systems” and nationalism in the 
Middle East.20  The purpose of the Jonglei Canal is to facilitate more reliable agriculture to all 
regions of Sudan, and to realize Sudan’s potential to be a source of agricultural abundance and 
proliferation.  Any nationalist movement in Sudan must represent the people who are served by 
the Jonglei Canal.  Garang wants the canal to serve everyone within Sudanese borders (as were 
delineated by the British at independence), and therefore his nationalism represents all ethnic 
groups in Sudan.  From Garang’s perspective, therefore, the Arab Northern government sought 
to serve itself with the Jonglei Canal and virtually neglect all other Sudanese, and had a 
nationalism that represented Arabs in Sudan.  Hence, the Khartoum government under Nimeiri 
implemented Shari’a and obliged every Sudanese of all races and religions to adhere to Islamic 
law.21  They sought to create an Arab national identity that discriminates many Sudanese people 
by default.  In this effort, they used the Jonglei Canal to benefit Arabs. John Garang had an 
inspiring hope for Sudan that sought to benefit all regions with equity.  It was a sleepless hope 
that fought ardently to provide abundance to all Sudanese peoples who have long suffered under 
neglect and exploitation.  
 
                                                          
19
 James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 198. 
20
 Ibid., 199. 
21
 “Sudanese Southerners Ask to End Islamic Law,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), April 18, 1985. 
7 
 
Nimeirism and Sudanism 
John Garang defines Nimeirism as a policy of divide and rule that oppresses the people of 
Sudan.22  He says that  
“the oppressor has divided the Sudanese people into Northerners and Southerners; 
Westerners and Easterners…while in the South, people have been politicized along tribal 
lines resulting in such ridiculous slogans as ‘Dinka Unity,’ ‘Great Equatoria’, ‘Bari 
Speakers’, ‘Luo Unity’ and so forth.  The oppressor has also divided us into Muslims and 
Christians, and into Arabs and Africans.”23   
According to Garang, separatism, or sentiments among Southerners that called for 
secession from the North, was a result of oppressive divide-and-rule tactics by the ruling elite.  
The divisions reflected in the Nimeiri regime were meant to weaken the “just cause” of the 
Sudanese people.  Nimeiri had perpetuated the “neo-colonial system” in which a “few people 
had amassed great wealth at the expense of the majority;” the “few” being those of the “minority 
clique regime.”24As was mentioned earlier, Garang formally lists Nimeiri’s offenses against the 
Sudanese people.  Garang’s overarching theme is that Nimeiri exploited and neglected all 
Sudanese outside of the oligarchy of the Arab ruling elite with policies of divide and rule, and by 
abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the first civil war in Sudan in 1972.  He 
points out that Nimeiri wanted to “deprive the South of mineral rich or prime agricultural land 
such as Hofrat el Nhas, Kafia Kingi, Northern Upper Nile, Bentiu, etc.”25 He boldly condemns 
this resource exploitation and says that “natural resources, wherever they are found in the Sudan, 
                                                          
22
 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 3 March 1984,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 19. 
23
 Ibid., 19. 
24
 Ibid., 19. 
25
 Ibid., 21. 
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belong to the whole Sudanese people.”26This is easily applicable to the case of the Jonglei Canal, 
where Khartoum wanted to manipulate the Jonglei Canal to benefit Khartoum; making the rest of 
Sudan a low priority.  Similarly, Garang argues that Nimeiri promoted an Arab nationalism that 
only served Arabs in Sudan.  The full extension of this nationalism is seen in the implementation 
of the “September Laws” of 1983, which forced all Sudanese to abide by Islamic Shari'a law.27  
This does not necessarily mean that Nimeiri’s motivation for implementing Shari’a was for 
reasons of Arab/Islamic nationalism.  It reflects the sentiment of Arab/Islamic nationalists who 
wanted to make Sudan an Arab/Islamic nation.  Also, Arab nationalism and Islamic nationalism 
are not necessarily the same thing, although they may go hand in hand.  Ultimately, in Garang’s 
perspective Nimeirism is a practice of rule that keeps power in the hands of a few (Arab 
Northern elites) at the expense of the masses.28  It is also inherently divisive and does not 
promote unity among the many different ethnic groups of Sudan, but is exploitive and 
oppressive.  In following Gelvin’s argument about nationalism, we can conclude that Garang’s 
nationalist ideology was formed in response to Arab and Islamic nationalisms in Sudan.  Gelvin 
articulates that “all nationalisms arise in opposition to some ‘other’” and that they are “defined 
by what they oppose.”29  Sudanism is defined as the enemy of sectarian nationalisms, against 
models of dictatorial rule such as Nimeirism, and against secessionism as we will see later.  
Garang struggles against nationalist ideologies that seek to oblige diverse Sudanese peoples to 
adopt a strictly Arab, African, Christian, or Islamic identity.  Sudanism is among the many 
nationalist ideologies that “defines itself by what it opposes.”    
                                                          
26
 Ibid., 21. 
27
 “Sudanese Southerners Ask to End Islamic Law.” 
28
 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 3 March 1984,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 21. 
29
 James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 93. 
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For Garag, Nimeirism, as a force of opposition to Sudanism, embodies all oppressive 
regimes in Sudan.  It can continue to exist even though the physical person of Jaafar Nimeiri may 
die.  This is evidenced when Garang refers to the “continuation of Nimeirism in a different 
uniform”30 and to the “struggle against all faces of Nimerism.”31  Nimeirism is the face of 
“sectarian chauvinism” and “religious bigotry.”32 It creates and perpetuates the suffering of 
Sudanese civilians.  John Garang’s nationalism, Sudanism, is the antithesis of Nimeirism. 
Garang’s Sudanism is committed to the “establishment of a NEW and democratic Sudan 
in which equality, freedom, economic and social justice and respect for human rights are at the 
core.”33  Sudanism seeks the liberation of the “whole” Sudan and the unity of its people and its 
“territorial integrity.”34 Its goal is to “enable the masses, and not the elites from different regions, 
to exercise real power for economic and social development of their regions.”35 Garang’s 
nationalism fights against separatism and heralds the unity of all Sudanese of all races, genders, 
religions, and ethnicities.  It recognizes that Sudan’s identity can be self-defined and decided by 
the people.   
In a statement at the Opening Session of the Preliminary Dialogue between SPLM/SPLA 
and the National Alliance for National Salvation at Koka Dam on March 20, 1986, Garang stated 
that the British went to America and formed a new nation, and although Americans have British 
origins they do not claim to be British, but American.36  He also argued that “Argentineans speak 
                                                          
30
 Garang, “Statement by John Garang on 26 and 27 May 1985, on the Second Anniversary of the Bor, 
Pibor and Fashalla resistance and Ayod Revolt,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 49. 
31Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at…Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in Khalid Call for 
Democracy, 118. 
32Garang, “Statement by John Garang on 26 and 27 May 19,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 73. 
33
 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 22 March 1985,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 26. 
34
 Ibid., 26. 
35
 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 9 April 1985, following the downfall of Nimeiri,” in Khalid Call for 
Democracy, 43. 
36
 Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at…Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in Khalid Call for 
Democracy, 128. 
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Spanish and are Christians, but they are Argentineans not Spaniards and are proud of being 
Argentineans.”37 His point is that Sudan can create its own “unique Sudanese civilization” or a 
New Sudan.38  By asserting that Sudan can create its own national identity, Garang confirms 
Gelvin’s argument that nationalist movements create nations.39  Nationalist movements do not 
bring “preexisting nations to a state of self-awareness,” but they are the authors of their own, 
“imagined” nation-states.40  Garang recognized the validity of all religions, languages, cultures, 
and ethnicities in Sudan.  An example of this is when he says that “there are Muslims and 
Christians in both the North and South, but some Sudanese are neither” and that “religion should 
never be a divisive force.”41 Sudanism recognizes that there are many different religions that are 
practiced in many different regions of Sudan, and that all of these religions should be accepted 
under the umbrella of the New Sudan, which represents all Sudanese peoples.  The New Sudan 
will “contribute to the Arab world and to the African world and to the human civilization.”42 
Sudanism replaces Arabism, Africanism, Islamization, Christianization, and all other forms of 
sectarianism.  It encompasses all of these religions and cultures and expresses them as a uniquely 
Sudanese identity.  Since Sudanism is democratic, it is inherently irreconcilable with 
sectarianism of any kind. 
In a conference with John Garang regarding the relief crisis at the U.S. Capitol in June 
1989, Garang elaborates on the problems of Sudan that are addressed in Sudanism.  The 
problems that he describes are dealt with under the umbrella of Sudanism.  He says that Sudan 
has “over 400 different ethnic groups” and that although it is a “multi-nationality country” the 
                                                          
37
 Ibid., 128. 
38
 Ibid., 128. 
39
 Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict, 14.  
40
 Ibid., 14. 
41
 Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at…Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in Khalid Call for 
Democracy, 129-30. 
42
 Ibid., 133. 
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Khartoum governments since 1956 have “treated the Sudan as a mono-nationality.”43  He 
continues and says that the Sudan is a multi-religious country, but Khartoum governments “favor 
one religion, Islam,” which is fully expressed in the imposition of Shari’a law.44  According to 
Garang “nobody is anybody’s minority and nobody is anybody’s majority. We are all Sudanese, 
full stop.”45  He believed that the union of Sudan’s numerous ethnicities, cultures, and religions 
eliminated the concept of a minority.  Everyone has equal representation and everyone is a 
majority.  From this perspective there is no “Southern problem” because if there is a problem for 
anyone in Sudan, no matter what region, then it is also the problem of all Sudanese.  Garang’s 
Sudanism fought to create a New Sudan “in which all nationalities and all the religious groups 
coexist.”46 Arabs, Africans, Christians, Muslims, Dinka, and Nuer are all united under Sudanism, 
and none is valued above the other.47  The unity of diverse people groups is fundamental to 
Sudanism.  Let’s remember that Garang is referring to diverse groups of people that all reside 
within the “piece of real estate” that was given to them by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial 
government at independence.  Garang could have chosen to support a Southern Sudanese 
nationalism, or a Dinka nationalism, or something of the like but he did not do this. This makes 
his nationalism peculiar and distinguishable from other nationalist movements in Sudan.  This is 
especially peculiar when analyzed in juxtaposition to Gelvin’s argument about Zionism and 
Jewish nationalism.  He claims that Jews needed their own “homeland” as a result of the anti-
Semitism that they faced in Europe and Russia, and that Zionism called for Jews around the 
                                                          
43
 Garang, “Excerpt from John Garang’s Policy Statement, 12 July 1988,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 
192. 
44
 Ibid., 192. 
45
 Garang, “Response of John Garang to Dr. El-Gizouli, 1 September 1985,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 
92. 
46
 Garang, “Seminar with John Garang de Mabior at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. Friday, 9 
June, 1989,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 213. 
47
 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 9 April 1985, following the downfall of Nimeiri,” and “Statement by 
John Garang on 26 and 27 May 1985,” in Khalid  Call for Democracy, 42, 58. 
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world to “embrace the idea that they constitute a single nation, united as in the case of all 
nations, by the ties and travails of history.”48  Garang was categorized as a black “African” from 
the Dinka ethnic group.  Africans have been historically marginalized and categorized as inferior 
to other groups such as Arabs and Europeans.  Sudanism represents the excluded and oppressed 
peoples.  Zionism is, in part, formed in response to Jewish marginalization and exclusion.  
However, unlike Zionism, Garang’s nationalism did not seek to unite all “Africans,” but included 
all peoples within the Sudanese territory, including Arabs.  Zionism does not do this, but instead 
unites all Jews, observant and nonobservant alike.  It does not invite other non-Jewish people 
groups to be a part of its nation.  This is what makes Sudanism distinct from other more universal 
nationalist movements such as Arabism and Zionism.  It is very much its own in that it sought to 
unite many different people groups within Sudan, and to include even those such as Arab ruling 
elites who had historically sought to unite Sudan according to Arabism in a discriminatory way.  
 
Origins of Sudanism 
John Garang’s “search for Sudanism” was a result of Sudan’s pre-colonial and colonial 
history.  He says that “modern Sudan is a product of historical development before, during, and 
after the alternate colonial rule of the Turks, the British, and the Egyptians” and that “our 
immediate task is to form a new Sudan.”49 Garang acknowledges the importance of colonial 
Turkish, British, and Egyptian influences in shaping Sudan’s contemporary ideas of nationalism 
and identity.  Sudanism seeks to make sense of and reconcile the identity crisis wrought from 
Turkish, British, and Egyptian influence.  It is hard to understand the significance of Sudanism 
and its origins if we do not understand the Ottoman and Anglo-Egyptian influence on Sudanese 
                                                          
48
 Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict, 51. 
49
 Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at...Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in Khalid Call for 
Democracy, 127. 
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identity.  Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule also influenced the territorial delineation of the present 
Sudan.  It is within this delineated territory that John Garang sought to unite all ethnicities, races, 
and religions. 
 Perhaps the best synopsis of this history is provided by the well acclaimed author on 
Sudanese identity, who served as the United Nations secretary-general for internally displaced 
persons, Francis M. Deng.50 Hundreds of years BCE Arab traders settled among the Sudanese 
and were very affluent.51 This association between Arabs and wealth gave Arabs privilege 
among the Sudanese.  In the seventh century the Arab Muslim Empire invaded and conquered 
the Sudan.  Arab Islamic wealth and privileged position made them an “appealing class for 
intermarriage with the leading Sudanese families.”52 Few Arabs settled in the South due to 
natural barriers.53 In 1820-1 the Turko-Egyptian forces took over the northern region of Sudan 
and it was a regime that was “politically and ideologically Islamic.”  The Turko-Egyptian regime 
was committed to Islamic orthodoxy through Shari’a law, or Islamic laws that applied to the 
whole country.  Their main reason for occupying Sudan was to obtain African slaves for the 
Egyptian army. The Turko-Egyptian regime exacerbated notions of black African inferiority, and 
reinforced the superiority of Arabism and Islam.  It also introduced Shari’a law, which 
previously played “a minor role in Sudanese life.”  The Sudanese opposed the Turko-Egyptian 
rule and saw them as “infidels” who were not deeply religious.54 The Turko-Egyptians were then 
overthrown by Muhammad Ahmed al-Mahdi (a Northern Arab) in the Mahdist revolution in 
                                                          
50
 Francis M. Deng is a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program at the Brookings Institution, 
and has served as the Sudan’s minister of state for foreign affairs; as its ambassador to Canada, the United States, 
and Scandinavia.  He is currently the Special Advisor to the UN-Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide. 
51
 Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1995), 9. 
52
 Ibid., 10. 
53
 Ibid., 10. 
54
 Ibid., 43, 46, 47, 48. 
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1885.55  The Mahdist regime maintained an Islamic identity in the Sudan, and slave raids 
continued in the southern regions of Sudan.  Shortly thereafter a joint British-Egyptian 
Condominium force conquered Sudan in 1899.56  The British implemented separate 
administrations for the North and the South, and favored Islamic education.57  This is a part of 
Britain’s “separatist” policies that worsened divisions between Northerners and Southerners.58 
Many British administrators “adopted” Arab attitudes toward African Southerners and regarded 
them as savages.59 Finally, the colonial administration spent much of their effort developing the 
North politically, economically, socially, and culturally, but ignored the South and left them 
“isolated, secluded, and undeveloped.”60 This is the historical backdrop from which John Garang 
forms his nationalist idea of Sudanism.  This is a very superficial, brief history of the Arabization 
and Islamization of Sudan, and there are many details missing.  However, it gives us a base 
understanding of the development of Arab/Islamic superiority (or of the “Arab hegemony”) in 
the North, and the neglect and inferiority bestowed on the African Southerners.    
We see this progression of the Arab/Islamic identity in Sudan, and the neglect and 
“exclusion” of the South.  Garang recognized that the current racial disparities and class 
distinctions between Northern Arabs and Southern Africans were a result of historical 
development.  He understood that the current divisions between Arabs and everyone else in 
Sudan took centuries to develop, and are firmly rooted in Sudanese history.  Deng suggests that 
Anglo-Egyptian colonial policy in Sudan exacerbated these divisions, and that ultimately, these 
divisions led to the first civil war in Sudan in the 1950s.  Garang took up arms against an 
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 Ibid., 55, 111. 
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 Ibid., 85. 
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unyielding division between the North and the South with his vision for a united Sudan.  He 
claimed that in  
“1956 our country gained formal independence and entered the era of neo-colonialism.  
Since then a small parasitic clique from pre-independence system of exploitation took 
over the former instruments of oppression for their own interests and against the wishes 
of the majority of the Sudanese people.”61 
John Garang points out a “neo-colonialism” at work in the Sudan that has adopted the oppressive 
policies of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in the form of a “domestic colonialism.”  He 
used Sudanism as an opposing force against the colonial legacy left by the Anglo-Egyptians and 
against the domestic colonialism of the Northern Arabs.  The development of the Sudanese 
identity and of the “Arab hegemony” was quite apparent to Garang.  He concedes that Sudan’s 
“major problem is that it has been looking and is still looking for its soul, for its true identity.”62 
Therefore, Garang offers a new identity for Sudan that does not promote the exploitation or 
discrimination of any races, ethnicities, or religions.  Sudanism is adamant about this equality 
because Sudanese history has constantly seen the aggrandizement and escalation of the Arab race 
and the exploitation and neglect of other races, especially of Southern Africans.  It is peculiar 
that Garang should seek to unite two groups of people who have become progressively more 
dichotomized and completely divided.  The Arab-African division has grown worse over many 
centuries, along with the development of the Arab ruling elite in the North who have neglected 
the Southern Sudanese.  This would cause one to wonder why Garang did not initially support a 
nationalism that favored separatism and self-determination for the Southern Sudanese. 
                                                          
61
 “Sudanese Rebel Leader’s Appeal to the People.” 
62
 Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at…Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in Khalid Call for 
Democracy, 127. 
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 Garang’s response to this is that “the oppressor,” which represents any ruling party or 
person in the Sudan that has oppressed and exploited the masses, has “time and again played 
various politics in order to destroy and weaken the just struggle of our people, including that 
most historic policy of divide and rule.”63 One of President Nimeiri’s main provocations of the 
Sudanese people was his “redivision” of the Southern Sudan into “three mini regions” in June 
1983, which Garang claims is “consistent with his policy of divide and rule.”64 It is clear that 
Garang viewed secessionism as a perpetuation of divisiveness in Sudan that had only served to 
weaken the Sudanese people, not empower them.  Garang clearly articulates this view when he 
says that “it was therefore natural that secessionist movements…developed in different periods 
in different areas of Sudan thereby jeopardizing the unity of the people and prolonging their 
suffering and struggle.”65 Secessionism is merely a manifestation of the inherent “divide and 
rule” tactics of the oppressor.  It does not help the cause for peace and prosperity of the exploited 
Sudanese, but actually weakens their struggle and “prolongs their suffering.”  Garang heralded a 
nationalism that opposes secessionism with the same zeal as it opposes the minority clique 
regimes.  He makes this undeniably clear when he says that “if anybody wants to separate even 
in the North, we will fight him because the Sudan must be one.  It should not be allowed to 
disintegrate or fragment itself.”66  He is talking about a piece of real estate that we call Sudan, 
but that has territorial boundaries that were delineated by the British.  Using Gelvin’s model, 
clearly Garang is “inventing the notion that a population used to exist” in Sudan that had a 
“common interest” and that this united population should not be allowed to “fragment itself.”67 
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Garang’s commitment to the unity of the invented Sudanese “nation” is ceaseless.  Sudanism has 
absolutely no tolerance for secessionism of any kind.  Both secessionism and minority clique 
regimes are enemies of Sudanism.   
 Another reason for Garang’s adamant policy of unity for the Sudan, and his intolerance 
of secessionism is because the first rebel movement of the Southern Sudan in the first Sudanese 
civil war that began in the 1950s was a secessionist movement.  Garang points out that during the 
formation of the SPLA/M in 1983 there was “bitter struggle” for six months in deciding the 
direction of the Movement because many separatists wanted a Movement that was “similar to the 
Anynya I rebel movement” of the first civil war that called for a “separate and independent 
Southern Sudan.”68 He exclaims that the “forces of reaction and separatism were defeated.”69  
This language and description of the struggle between unity and separatism reflects the enmity 
between Sudanism and secessionism.  Garang comments on the Anyanya I Movement and says 
that the “separation of the South was the primary objective of the Anyanya Movement.”70 He 
disagrees with this position and instead concludes that the  
“problem in the Sudan is not that of the South separating or the West separating or the 
East separating, it is essentially a problem of justice.  If justice is brought about then 
nobody would wish to separate and so we would build a unity of the country.”71 
In Garang’s model of nationalism, justice is brought about by the complete restructuring of 
political power in Khartoum, so that all races, religions, and cultures are represented in Sudan.72  
With this restructuring of power comes the implementation of Sudanism--a Sudanese nationalism 
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that unites all ethnicities, religions, and cultures in Sudan under a secular, democratic, socialist 
system that honors human rights.73 
 
Factionalism and Secessionism  
Garang’s unyielding determination for Sudanese unity, and his intolerance of 
secessionism, created much factionalism among the SPLA leaders and other Southern Sudanese.  
This is not to say that Garang’s unity policy was the only source of factionalism, but it definitely 
played a substantial role.  The Anyanya II movement, one of the first Southern factional rebel 
groups in the 1980s, opposed the SPLA on ideological grounds.  In some statements, the 
Anyanya II accuses Garang of being a Communist and of wanting to spread communism 
throughout Sudan.74  Gabriel Gany, a council member of the Anyanya II, also points out that the 
Anyanya II movement wanted “federal rule in the South while the SPLA fought for liberating the 
whole Sudan.”75  They also accuse Garang of human rights abuses against the Southern citizens, 
and of dictatorial leadership.76 Ultimately, it is ideological differences between the Anyanya II 
and Garang that play a substantial role in the fierce Southern conflicts. 
 The SPLA-Nasir faction was another prominent, Southern rebel faction that opposed 
Garang’s SPLA/M on ideological grounds.  The Nasir faction was formed in August of 1991 
when two former members of the High Command of the SPLA, Riek Machar and Lam Akol 
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issued a radio message to the SPLA that called for the removal of John Garang from 
leadership.77 This call for his deposition was outlined in a tract titled “Why Garang Must Go 
Now.”78 Initially Machar and Akol based their defection from the SPLA/M on the dictatorial 
leadership of John Garang79and accused him of committing countless human rights abuses 
against SPLA/M members.80 However, on January 24, 1992 the SPLM/A Nasir faction 
expressed their goals for Southern self-determination and the separation of the South from the 
North.81 The Nasir faction did not endorse Sudanism, and saw the hope for a united Sudan as 
unrealistic.82 We can see that issues of ideology are fundamental to factional movements against 
the SPLA/M.  At a delegation between Lam Akol and the Nasir faction with the Nigerian 
Government, it was pointed out that “secession is the will of the Southern people and Garang 
knows this very well.”83 It was concluded that Garang’s movement was “doomed” because it did 
not reflect the goals and “aspirations” of the Southern people.84  There is a real fervency against 
Garang’s mission for a united Sudan based on Sudanism.  We see bold condemnation of 
Garang’s nationalism that claimed that he was not representing the will of the people, but that he 
was instead promoting a self-interested nationalism.  According to Gelvin’s argument this would 
invalidate his Sudanism because it did not reflect the “common interest” or “common good” of 
the people that it was attempting to unite.  Garang faced much opposition from Southern 
separatists, which resulted in many human rights violations and the slaughter of innocent 
civilians by all parties involved.  Sudanism cannot co-exist with separatist ideologies, and this is 
reflected in the violent conflict between Garang’s SPLA/M and the Anyanya II and Nasir 
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faction.  There may have been other reasons for the dissension between the SPLA/M and the 
Anyanya II and the Nasir faction, but among these sources of conflict, issues of ideology always 
arise. 
 There are claims against John Garang’s unity stance, as was mentioned earlier, that say 
that the sentiment of the Southern people was for secession and self-determination.  Therefore, 
separatists concluded that Garang was not fighting for the “common interest” of the Sudanese 
people.  In the 1990s, there was a lot of pressure put on John Garang to change his position for a 
united Sudan, and to concede to self-determination and secession for the South.  This would 
inevitably forfeit the implementation of Sudanism. Scholars tend to agree that the unity policy 
was important for causing factionalism.85  There is overwhelming unanimity among scholars 
regarding the Southern sentiment toward secession.  Most acknowledge that the majority of 
Southerners favored secession over a united Sudan, and that they fought under John Garang with 
this underlying sentiment in their hearts.86  Obviously Lam Akol, John Garang’s opponent, 
agrees with scholars and claims that the “Southern Sudanese received the call for a United Sudan 
with great skepticism and finally total rejection.”87 
 There is a strong case to be made for this reality, because it is hard to understand why 
there was so much factionalism and internal, violent Southern conflict, unless John Garang was, 
in fact, not representing the political goals and hopes of the Southern Sudanese people.  
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Although Garang claimed to be fighting on behalf of all of Sudan, not just the South, it is 
important to mention the South because this is the group that has faced much of the historical 
marginalization and exploitation by the North.  The South comprises many of the oppressed 
peoples for whose liberation Garang claimed to fight.  Therefore, if Garang did not represent the 
sentiment of the Southern people then his movement was not for the “common good” of all.  
Obviously there are other reasons that fueled and perpetuated Southern, factional conflict, but 
ideology definitely seems to play a role.  This is especially seen in the fact that the SPLA-Nasir 
faction and the Anyanya II Movement posed secessionist goals for the South in their public 
statements and documents. 
 Garang’s opposition to Southern secession can best be explained by comparing it to 
Arabism and Zionism.  Gelvin claims that Zionism seeks to unite all Jews into one nation and 
into one identity.88  Arab nationalisms seek to unite people within different territorial boundaries 
according to Arab culture.  Garang’s Sudanism does a similar thing, but it is hard to discern this 
because he sought to unite 400 different ethnic groups into one Sudanese identity.  Garang saw 
the eclectic Sudanese population as bearing an undeniable, distinct Sudanese identity in the same 
way that Zionists see Jews as all being distinctly Jewish, and as Arab nationalists see Arabs as 
being distinctly Arab.  This elucidates Garang’s motivations for struggling against secessionism 
and for detesting the fragmentation of the Sudanese nation.  This, of course, is only relevant if 
Garang’s nationalism promoted the true “common interest” of all the people of the “invented” 
Sudan.   
 If Sudanism does not reflect the majority sentiment of the marginalized people of Sudan, 
then it seems that it is a self-interested nationalism.  It is not a valid nationalism according to 
Gelvin if it does not reflect the “common interest” of the Sudanese populace.  Sudanism is not a 
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legitimate movement of liberation if it is only favorable to Northern Arabs, because Garang’s 
movement is meant to liberate people from the oppression of the Arab hegemonic system that 
has exploited the non-Arab Sudanese.  I am not saying that Garang’s nationalism was appealing 
to the Northern Arabs, although some argue that a united Sudan was appealing to Northerners, 
but I am saying that if it did, then it would not be a nationalism of the Sudanese masses.  
Garang’s movement called for the overthrow of the existing Northern Arab political ruling 
system, for the restructuring of power, and a redistribution of that political power equally among 
all people groups of Sudan under a united Sudan.  However, this model is futile and unreflective 
of Southern aspirations if the marginalized people of Sudan favor secessionism, and not unity.   
 
 
Southern Sentiment: Unity or Secession? 
The extent of the Southern sentiment about secessionism is difficult to ascertain.  
Obviously there is dissension at the Southern political level, as one of the main tenets of the 
Southern factional movements called for an independent, self-determined South Sudan.  If there 
was a majority sentiment for secession in the South, then at the very least it was not strong 
enough to oust John Garang from his position of Commander-in-Chief of the Movement. This 
does not mean that there was not a strong secessionist sentiment in the South, but it simply 
means that it was not overwhelming enough to unite all of the Southern Sudanese under a 
secessionist position.  Whether or not Garang’s Sudanism reflected the true aspirations of a 
majority of the marginalized Sudanese masses is hard to say in the context of this paper.  I will 
say that John Garang remained consistent and persistent with his goals for a united New Sudan in 
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the era of factionalism, while Riek Machar and Lam Akol seem to have compromised their 
objectives and the objectives of liberation for the Southern Sudanese. 
The genesis of the Nasir faction headed by Machar and Akol is a helpful starting point for 
tracing the political progression of the two faction leaders.  In a radio message to all units of the 
SPLA on August 28th, 1991, they claimed that Garang had been “deposed” as the Chairman of 
the SPLA/M and that Riek Machar would “take over as the interim leader until a National 
Convention was called to elect the leader of the Movement.”89  The reality is that Garang was not 
deposed and that he remained the leader of the SPLA/M.  If this were not the case then he would 
not have been introduced and addressed as the Chairman of the Movement at different peace 
meetings thereafter.  Machar and Akol’s declaration against Garang did result in the creation of a 
new Southern faction and did have some popularity, but it did not have the restructuring effect 
for which they had hoped.  If the Southern sentiment was so overwhelmingly secessionist and 
anti-Garang then it should have been unanimous enough to depose Garang.  It was not strong 
enough to overthrow him though.  It certainly weakened the movement as it resulted in brutal 
conflict between Southern factions and in the wanton slaughter of thousands of civilians. 
 After unsuccessfully attempting to overthrow John Garang, Machar and Akol began to 
collude with the Khartoum government and receive government military support to combat John 
Garang’s SPLA-Torit.90  The government also supported other anti-Garang groups such as the 
Anyanya II and Arab militias militarily in order to weaken Garang’s SPLA Movement.91 The 
Nasir faction, the Anyanya II Movement, and the Arab militias such as the Murhallin, all 
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committed inhumane atrocities against Sudanese civilians, especially against the Dinka.92 One of 
the most notorious acts of atrocious violence against civilians by government-sponsored Arab 
militias is the massacre of approximately 1,500 Dinka civilians in the town of Al-Daein in 
1987.93  Amnesty International accused Machar’s Nasir faction in 1993 of killing approximately 
2,000 Dinka.94  Garang’s SPLA also has a record of human rights abuses, although it is less 
atrocious then that of government funded Southern factions and militias. I point out the atrocities 
of the Nasir faction in order to show that Machar and Akol initially oppose Garang because of 
his dictatorial and inhumane leadership, and because Machar and Akol claimed to support the 
true secessionist goals of the Sudanese masses.  Yet, soon after the genesis of the Nasir faction, 
they began receiving military support from the government, and then commit heinous human 
rights abuses against Southern Sudanese civilians.  The Nasir faction especially targeted Dinka 
civilians because of their association with John Garang.  John Garang was a Dinka,95 and had 
been accused by some as leading a Movement that was seeking Sudanese domination by the 
Dinka.  Riek Machar was a Nuer, which is sometimes seen as a rival of the Dinka, and there are 
scholars such as Sarah E. Hutchinson who make strong cases for the tribal nature of the conflicts 
between Garang’s SPLA and Machar’s Nasir faction.96  This aspect of the Southern factional 
conflict is too dense for the scope of this paper, but is necessary to mention when discussing the 
violent acts of inhumanity committed by all of the Southern factions including Garang’s SPLA-
Torit faction. To reiterate, however, Dinka civilians associated with Garang were not only 
targeted by the Nasir faction, but were also heavily targeted by the Arab militias employed by 
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the government, as is seen in the Al-Daein massacre of 1987.  Why is it that the Nasir faction 
claims to represent the secessionist sentiments of Southerners and for their liberation, but also 
colludes with an oppressive government and massacres Dinka civilians?  Were the Dinka people 
so unanimously pro-Garang that the Nasir faction felt it necessary to slaughter them in order to 
accomplish secessionist goals for the suffering Sudanese?  Machar’s Nasir faction was not alone 
in its human rights abuses.  Garang’s SPLA also committed its share of human rights violations 
against suffering Sudanese civilians and dissenters within the SPLA, which obviously 
perpetuated the conflict between the Nasir faction and Garang.97 However, if the oppressed 
people of Sudan were so anti-Garang and so pro-secession, then the Nasir faction would not have 
needed to garner a lot of military support from the “minority clique regime” and massacre 
civilians in order to defeat Garang.  The truth may be that anti-Garang and pro-secessionist 
aspirations were not as prominent as Machar and Akol had claimed.  This does not mean that 
Garang reflected the majority sentiment of the marginalized Sudanese, but it does mean that he 
had enough support to remain the leader of a prominent rebel army in Sudan.   
 I argue that there were two reasons for the collusion of the Nasir faction with the 
Khartoum government.  The first is that the Nasir faction lacked the resources and the popularity 
to overthrow John Garang, and therefore had to acquire government support.  Secondly, as is 
widely accepted, the Khartoum government continually instigated Nasir-Torit conflict and used 
the Nasir faction to weaken the whole Sudanese rebel movement.98  This fits perfectly into John 
Garang’s ideology that the “oppressor” constantly seeks to “divide and rule” the Sudanese 
people to their demise.  The government supported the Nasir faction in order to divide the whole 
rebel cause, and then continue to exercise control and exploitive power over them.  Clearly, 
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Garang must have despised the Nasir faction’s adultery against the Sudanese people as they slept 
with the enemy in Khartoum. 
 Eventually Riek Machar’s faction, which changed from being the Nasir faction to the 
Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), along with four other Southern Sudanese 
rebel factions, signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government in April of 1997.99  
These five Southern rebel factions “fused” together to become the United Democratic Southern 
Sudan Salvation Front (UDSSF).  In that same year President Omar Bashir, who is currently the 
dictator of Sudan and who has a notoriously poor human rights record, “issued a decree” that 
made Machar the president and ruler of the Southern Coordination Council for a period of four 
years.100 It is essential to note that Machar was appointed this leadership position by the 
command of the government, not by the decision of the Southern Sudanese people.  A little more 
than a year after the signing of the Khartoum peace agreement there was already “fierce 
fighting” within the UDSSF.  Paulino Matip, a pro-government commander at Bentiu, and 
another faction called the Bor group, both defected from the UDSSF because they claimed that 
Riek Machar “was unfair in distributing posts when he set up the administration in the south.”101  
Although the Southern factions herald separatism, and claim to represent the true aspirations of 
the South, there is much internal conflict and dissension.  Machar compromised their objectives, 
and compromised the long-term liberation of the Sudanese people by receiving government 
support to commit atrocities against pro-Garang civilians in the first place.  Not only this, but 
Machar becomes a tool in a so called “democratic,” government-run machine that only leads to 
more factionalism, and leaves the Sudanese identity unresolved.  In this light, I do not believe 
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that the Southern factions represented the true sentiment of the Sudanese people regarding 
secession and unity.  According to Garang’s Sudanism, which calls for the overthrow of the 
current government and the complete restructuring of political power, Machar compromised the 
hope of Sudan.  It makes sense that Machar and other Southern factional leaders would end their 
struggle against the government after more than a decade of ceaseless violence and civilian 
misery.  Nonetheless, they submitted to the “oppressor” and enabled him to continue the legacy 
of marginalization and discrimination of non-Arab Sudanese.  The Nasir faction and all other 
Southern Sudanese factions failed according to Garang’s nationalist model because they did not 
achieve a new national identity for Sudan that recognized all ethnicities, religions, and cultures 
as being “Sudanese.”  Garang did not recognize the validity of the Khartoum Peace Agreement 
because it did not solve Sudan’s fundamental issues of identity.102  The Khartoum Peace 
Agreement signified the submission of those of the “just” cause, and could only appease the 
Sudanese masses for a short time.  Garang’s Sudanism could not prevail in a political system that 
was still regulated and controlled by the same oppressive government as before.  He remained 
zealous for long-term Sudanese unity that redefined the Sudanese identity.  It seems that he was 
correct to not compromise his goals by joining the UDSSF, because internal violence and 
conflict ensued within the “united” Southern factions shortly after the signing of the Khartoum 
Peace Agreement.  Sudanism could not be nurtured or bear fruit under the stipulations of the 
Khartoum Peace Agreement.   
 Ultimately, we can, at the very least, conclude that John Garang was fervent and 
unyielding in his pursuit of Sudanism.  While adamant secessionists such as Machar and Akol 
compromised their own objectives and colluded with the “oppressor” to the detriment of 
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countless civilians, John Garang remained consistent about achieving a new united Sudan that 
was democratic and that did not discriminate based on race, religion, or culture.  He continued to 
fight for a new Sudanese identity that was an eclectic combination of all the races, religions, and 
cultures in Sudan, and that redefined the Sudanese identity.   
 
Ethiopian Influence on Garang’s Position of Unity 
Having questioned the validity of the unanimity of the Southern sentiment for secession, 
and arguing for Garang’s genuine persistence in fighting for a new, united Sudan, let us consider 
Garang’s nationalist agenda in the context of Ethiopia’s political and military support of Garang 
and the SPLA/M.  It could be argued that John Garang remained adamant about achieving a 
united Sudan because he was receiving political/military support from Mengistu’s Communist 
Ethiopian regime at a time when Ethiopia was fighting the separatist rebellion of Eritrea.  In fact, 
some have made this argument or an argument similar to it, which, at the very least, recognizes 
the close connection between Garang and Mengistu.103 Part of this argument is reinforced by the 
claim that after the fall of Mengistu’s Marxist regime in 1991, Garang began gravitating toward 
more secessionist-type policies such as self-determination.104  Eritrea waged a “secessionist” war 
against Mengistu’s regime and earned their right to self-determination and ultimately voted for 
its independence from Ethiopia in 1991.105 
It is true that Garang began promoting policies that were more favorable toward self-
determination, and which seemed to be progressing toward secession.  Most notably in the 1990s 
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and onward, he espoused a policy of confederation, in which the North and the South would have 
had separate constitutions.106  In an interview with Kenyan TV in 2000, he clarified that this 
confederation would be for an interim period of two to four years until the issue of the separation 
of religion and state was resolved, or more specifically the repeal of Shari’a law.107 This policy 
basically offers self-determination to the Southern Sudan, which contrasts with Garang’s former 
position that opposed self-determination.  Garang’s espousal of confederation seems to 
contradict the tenets of Sudanism, and seems to forfeit the hope of a united Sudan that represents 
all ethnicities, cultures, and religions.  However, Garang defends his confederation policy against 
these accusations in a couple of ways.  He basically claims that confederation is a last resort and 
that it is only a policy option because the Khartoum government will not “abandon Shari’a, and 
that the south refuses to be governed by it.”108  Shari’a law was so inherently discriminatory 
against the Sudanese people who Garang sought to liberate, that it forced him to compromise for 
a policy of confederation.  Confederation is not a primary option for Garang by any means, but it 
was the only way that he could maintain the liberation struggle for the Sudanese populace in the 
midst of Northern stubbornness regarding the separation of religion and state.  In a press 
interview in 1997 he defended his nationalist motives for a united Sudan against accusations of 
growing secessionist sentiments in his movement.  He exclaimed that  
 “Our objectives on the unity of Sudan have been principled and firm since 1983. We 
fought for it and continue to stress and adhere to this unity. Talking about unity in 
absolute terms creates vagueness. We are talking about a real unity on the ground, a unity 
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based on the historic and contemporary diversity of Sudan, a unity I am proud of and one 
I am ready to defend.”109 
Six years after the fall of the Ethiopian regime, Garang still heralds the vision for a united Sudan 
with audacity and steadfastness.  Some think that Garang had underlying secessionist motives, 
but I disagree.  It is clear that confederation was not an attractive option to Garang, but was 
merely a better option than living under the regime of “clique-chauvinism” that perpetrated the 
racial, religious, and cultural oppression to which the Sudanese people had become so miserably 
accustomed.  He did not call for blatant secession like Machar or Akol, and even his advocacy of 
self-determination is in the hope of a future united Sudan.   
Garang reaffirms his position multiple times, including in an interview with an Egyptian 
Magazine in 1998 and he says  
“The issue of a confederation came as a reaction to the government's stance and refusal to 
have a united Sudan on the basis of certain principles - the most important of which is the 
separation of religion and state. They rejected our proposal and hence we demanded a 
confederation because peoples from different religious faiths cannot live under a 
theocracy. This is the real reason.”110 
Garang’s nationalism situates itself in opposition to Arab and Islamic nationalisms, because 
nationalisms define themselves according to what they oppose as Gelvin argues.  Sudanism could 
not exist in the Arab dominated political system that forced all of its citizens to adhere to Islamic 
law.  Therefore, it would have to lay dormant in a system of confederation until a united Sudan 
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could be achieved; if it can ever be achieved.  Sudanism can only be implemented when the 
existing political system is overthrown.  Garang called for the complete restructuring of political 
power in Sudan and the repeal of Shari’a law so that there is complete equality of representation.  
It is only after this restructuring of power that the nationalism of Sudanism can be realized. 
 The SPLA/M’s close relationship with Mengistu’s Ethiopian regime very well may have 
obliged Garang to maintain a position that favored a united Sudan.  However, Garang’s hope for 
the “whole” Sudan as becoming the “Breadbasket of the Middle East” seems to be proof of less 
self-interested motives for espousing a united Sudan.  Also, for successive years after the fall of 
the Ethiopian regime, Garang continued to maintain a fervent hope for Sudanese unity and for 
the liberation of the Sudanese people from discriminatory and oppressive regimes; from 
Nimeirism essentially.  When Garang concedes to a system of confederation, he does it in the 
interest of a truly united Sudan for the future.  He allows confederation because it protects 
Southerners and other Sudanese people such as the Nuba from the discrimination of the 
Arab/Islamic North.  Garang’s favor of confederation seems to follow Abel Alier’s logic that “if 
a Northern government continues to want a new Sudan based on Islamic fundamentalism then 
Southern Sudan will be forced to seek independence.”111 This does not mean that Garang 
supported independence, but independence does seem inevitable if the Khartoum government 
does not yield in its pursuit of a purely Arab/Islamic identity for the Sudan.   Confederation is 
not meant to be submission to secession, but is meant to leave the Sudanese people with an 
option for achieving a new, united Sudan. 
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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 
 A final analysis of John Garang’s commitment to Sudanism is best made by observing the 
stipulations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed by the SPLA/M and 
the Government of Sudan in 2005.  Some important stipulations in the agreement, for our 
purposes, include the right of the Southern Sudanese to self determination, which offers them the 
opportunity to vote on a referendum in 2011 that will decide whether or not the Southern Sudan 
will secede from the North or remain united.112  The agreement also states that there will be a 
separate Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), whose president would be John Garang until 
elections for new legislators and representatives are held after the six year interim period.113  A 
main priority of the GOSS is to be a link between the Khartoum government and the Southern 
Sudanese people during the interim period, and to govern the affairs of Southern Sudan as a part 
of a wider, national, united Sudan.114 
 In some ways the CPA resembles a separation between Northern and Southern Sudan, 
and seems to pave the way for secession.  This would cause us to infer that Garang had adopted 
secessionist sentiments and submitted to separatist policies.  He addresses the issue of the self 
determination of the South as is stipulated in the CPA by saying that his hope for Sudan is that 
self-determination will result in the Sudanese people deciding by their “free will” to be a united 
Sudan.115  His hope was for a “voluntary” unity of the Sudan that upholds “honor and dignity for 
all its citizens regardless of their race, regardless of their religion, and regardless of their 
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gender.”116 If this equality is not achieved, then Garang concedes that the “union” between the 
North and South will be peacefully severed through the self-determination of the South.117  The 
independence of the Southern Sudan is therefore an option for John Garang when he signs the 
CPA in 2005.  This is fundamentally different from his policies of the 1980s, which vowed 
complete enmity with all secessionists.118  Especially, when previously in the 1980s, Garang 
condemned secessionism as a tool of the “oppressor” used to “divide and rule” the “excluded,” 
suffering Sudanese people.119  Amidst Garang’s lucid “compromise”of his previous aspirations, 
he still hoped for a united Sudan.  Secession was not his hope for the future of Sudan, but was 
instead a buffer, or a safe-guard against falling back into the “old Sudan” of oppression and 
Arab/Islamic clique regimes.  Garang claimed that he aspired for a “real paradigm shift from the 
old Sudan of exclusivity to the new Sudan of inclusivity achieved not through force but through 
the exercise of the right of self determination.”120 Self-determination is meant to reflect the 
Southern Sudan’s “common interest” for a united Sudan.  It is not meant to result in the 
secession of the South, but is to be the realization of genuine Sudanese unity.  Circumstance 
most certainly forced Garang to compromise some of his initial policies, but not necessarily at 
the expense of Sudanism.  It seems that Garang resolved that he could change some of his former 
policies without jeopardizing the implementation of Sudanism.  He also submitted to “actually” 
allowing the people to decide their fate rather than continue to wage a hauntingly brutal and 
vicious war that seemed to have no end.  He gave the Sudanese people the opportunity to create 
their own nationalism, as Gelvin might agree.  They can either be Southern Sudanese 
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nationalists, or Arab nationalists, or Dinka nationalists, or Nuer nationalists, etc.  The only nation 
that will be validated globally will be the one that is created and implemented as a result of the 
referendum in 2011.  All of these nationalist ideologies are valid in so much as they truly reflect 
the aspirations of the people in the nations which they seek to create.   
After 22 years of civil war, John Garang still hoped for and deeply advocated a united 
Sudan that accepted a new national identity of Sudanism.  To reiterate, Sudanism is a national 
identity that refutes an Arab national identity, refutes an African national identity, and refutes 
both a Christian and Islamic national identity, and instead fuses all of the different religions, 
ethnicities, and cultures into one, uniquely Sudanese national identity.  This is his peculiar 
nationalist ideology.   
 
Conclusion 
Using James L. Gelvin’s argument about nationalist ideologies, which states that nations 
are created by nationalists and that nationalisms must promote the “common interest” of the 
populations of the nations they create, we have traced the development of John Garang’s 
nationalism of Sudanism.  John Garang was a nationalist and his movement was nationalist at the 
core.  Sudanism is defined in opposition to all nationalisms and political practices that do not 
include the “excluded” and that do not unite all of the ethnic groups, religions, and cultures 
within the territorial boundaries of Sudan.  It also opposes secessionism much in the same way 
that a Zionist would oppose dissension among Jews who refute the idea of global Jewish unity.  
John Garang remained consistent and persistent in his pursuit of his nationalist agenda, and 
hoped for a united Sudan and for a new, distinctly Sudanese identity.      
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To the great tragedy of those who shared John Garang’s optimism, and who trusted in 
him to implement a viable peace for the “excluded” Sudanese, John Garang was killed in a 
helicopter crash on a flight from Uganda to Southern Sudan on the weekend of July 31, 2005.121  
The question of whether or not Sudanism will die with him will be decided in the Southern 
referendum vote in 2011.  It is then that we will learn the true sentiment of the Southern 
Sudanese people.  Will they adopt a new, permanent national identity based on Sudanism?  Or 
will they fulfill the claims of many scholars, and decide to be an independent nation that is not 
united with Northern Sudan?  Will Sudanism ever be realized, or will it merely die and be buried 
among many other unrealized nationalist ideologies in recent history?  Is John Garang’s death 
the “for-itself moment” of the Hegelian dialectic of Sudanism,122and will Sudanism only be 
realized after his death, or is he just another dead rebel?123  Did Dr. John Garang de Mabior push 
down the monster’s body, the body of Nimeirism, or does the monster still stand?  Is the monster 
falling or is it lifting itself up, only to ruin the hope of Sudan?  It is the people who removed the 
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monster’s head in the first place, and it will be the people who decide what becomes of its body.  
If Sudanism is to be the sword with which Nimeirism is permanently slain, then it will be the 
people who wield it.  May they wield this sword in unity and “dig out a mountain with 
shovels!”124 
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